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Summary findings
Hoekman  and Mavroidis  argue that further moves  t+  discriminarion  between  domestic  and foreign  products.
liberalize  trade and to implement  existing  GATT  rules  Little  use  has been  made of the GATIT  in this
and princ  ples may  have a greater  impact on global  connection.  Perhaps  existing  indirc,.t  avenues for raising
competition  than would the pursuit of harmonization  of  competition-related  disputes  in the GATT should be
competition  policy.  pursued more actively. This would help identify what
They  also suggest  that current GATT  rules and cas.  specific  government  policies  might  be the subject  of
law provide  scope for disputes  to be brought before the  multilateral  negotiations  and  explicitly  incorporated  into
GATT  that relate to hoth the application  and the  the GAIT framework.
nonapplication  of existing  domestic  competition  laws  of
GATT  contracting  parties.  This leads  to de  facto
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I. Introduction
Competition  policy is frequently  mentioned  as an issue area that should  be on the agenda
of the next  round  of multilateral  trade negotiations.  Whether  or not the Uruguay  round  is concluded
successfully,  competition  policy-related  matters are likely  to confront  policymakers  increasing!y
often in the immediate  future.  Sir Leon Brittan is perhaps best krown among those who have
called for multilateral disciplines  in the area of competition  policy, proposing that:
The next GAIT  Round should include restrictive business practices and cartels on its
agenda. The aim  should  be to draw up common  rules, lay down  the  principle  that  restrictive
arrangements  are not enforceable  at law  and that  governments  are responsible  internationally
for the  implementation  of these  rules and  procedures  ... For mergers, commnon  rules should
also be established, as well as a common commitment  to enforce them (1992, p.  108,
emphasis added).'
Thle  rationales  that have been suggested  for addressing  competition  policy in the GATT context
include: (1) inadequate  enforcement  or nonexistence  of national  antitrust rules for traded  goods
and/or  for nontraded  sectors  such  as distribution  may  distort  trade  flows;  (2) enforcement  of national
competition  laws may  distort  trade, e.g., an antitrust  exemption  for export  cartels;  (3) conglomerates
with substantial market power at the global level are beyond the reach of national antitrust
jurisdictions;  and (4) antidumping  policies  are inconsisteiit  with the  criteria  employed  under  domestic
competition  rules. 2
Some  of these dimensions  are closely  linked. For example, an advocate  of antidumping
policies might argue it is a justifiable attempt by importing country governments  to offset the
market access restrictions existing in an exporting  firm's home country that underlie  the ability
of such firms to dump.  Such restrictions may consist of import barriers preventing arbitrage,
but may also reflect the non-existence  or non-enforcement  of competition  law by the exporting
' Se&  also Jacquemin  (1993), who has supported  Brittan's suggestion. See Bhagwati  (1993), Meessen  (1989)
and Trachtmnan  (1993) for evaluations  of the need for -- or welfare  effects -- of harmonization  of competition  and
related policies as opposed to coordination/cooperation,  and Davidow  (1981) for a discussion  of past history.
2 See, e.g., Ostry (1990), Feketlekuty  (1992), and Boner and Krueger (1991).2
country. 3 Antidumping can then be defended as  a  second-best instrument to offset such
'government-made'  competitive  differences, the first-best solution  being held to be the adoption
of common competition  policies.  Conversely,  those who emphasize  the protectionist  nature of
antidumping  policy invariably  point out the inconsistency  of the underlying  rules and prinQiples
with those of domestic  competition  laws.  While the conclusion  drawn is also that antidumping
should  be replaced  with  procedures  that  are consistent  with  competition  legislation,  the second-best
rationale for the s'atus quo is rejected. 4
In Section  II the question  is asked  whether the purstiit of inter-governmental  cooperation
on competition  policy is the best way of increasing  competition  and should therefore be given
priority.5 Competition  or antitrust  rules are simply  one type  of policy  that  affect the contestability
of markets.  Other policies may have a more direct impact on competition. Trade barriers in
particular - including  voluntary  export restraint (VER)  agreements  and antidumping  aetions  - are
perhaps  the primary means  of restricting  the contestability  of a market,  and are often  complemented
Ly nonborder  measures such as subsidies, discriminatory  procurement  practices, or differences
in standards. A number  of these  non-border  measures  have  been subjected  to multilP*:311y  agreed
disciplines,  but these can be strengthened  substantially. Will focusing  on competitio,i  policy  be
more productive in terms of enhancing the contestability of markets than focusing on other
government  policies that more directly restrict market access or distort competition? Clearly an
exclusive  focus on competition  policy  is not optimal, nor is this proposed by anyone. The issue
is to determine  the relative weight  that should  be given to this policy area, and the approach  that
could  be followed. We argue that  efforts might more  productively  center on ensuring  that current
GATT (or post-Uruguay  Round)  rules and principles  enhancing  competition  are actually  applied
by contracting  parties, and on further attempts  to eliminate  the 'loopholes' in the GAIT allowing
3 Thus,  the U.S. has claimed that lax Japanese  antitrust enforcement  permnits  Japanese  firms to collude, raise
prices, and use  part of the resulting  rents to cross-subsidize  (dump)  products sold on foreign  markets  (Trachtman,
1993, p. 54).
4 E.g., Barcelo (1979), Caine (1981), Messerlin  (1990).
51  In this  paper competition  policy is defined  as the set of rules and  disciplines  maintained  by governments  relating
to the exercise  of market  power  and the abuse  of a dominant  position  by enterprises. The underlying  objective  tends
to be efficient resource allocation, and therefore the maximization  of national welfare.  Comperition  is used as a synonym
for contestability  of markets.3
contracting  parties to impose  trade restrictions. Of course, political  considerations  may  prohibit
this. But, if so, serious  doubts  can be expressed  regarding  the impact  on competition  of the outcome
of discussions  in the GATT  on the  coordinated  application  or harmonization  of competition  policy.
Section III investigates  the reach of current GATT rules and disciplines  with respect to
business practices restricting the contestability  of markets, and explores the extent to which a
'minimalistic' approach might be pursuea in this area.  Jackson (1992) has suggested  a number
of possible ways to approach  competition  policy-related  issues from a GATT perspective,  one
uf which is to develop an interpretation  of GATT in this respect.  This part of the paper can be
seen as an attempt to pursue this suggestion. It involves an exploration  of the scope to bring
'violation  cases' (alleging  that a govemment  action is inconsistent  with a GATT rule) and 'non-
violation cases' (claiming  that implementation  of GATT-con :stent measures have nonetheless
nullified  orimpaired prior negotiated  conditions  of market  access). The wording  and interpretation
of current GATE rules arc such that many competition  policy-related  issues 6 can be raised if
government  support  of such  practices  leads  to de  facto discrimination  between  domestic  and forelo.I
products.  A key issue in this regard is the definition  of 'support'.  A case is made that passive
support, e.g.,  exemptions  from - or nonenforcement  of - antitrust already may be sufficient  to
bring complaints  before GATT.
Section  IV provides  a summary  of which  competition-distorting  practices  can be addressed
under  the existing  GATE,  identifies  a number  of the more  important  practices  that  currently  cannot
be addressed in the GATE forum, and discusses  the desirability  and some the implications  of
expanding  multilateral  disciplines  to the latter.  Section V concludes.
II.  GATT as an Instrument to Increase  Competition  Through  Market Access
Although the GATE negotiating  agenda has expanded.  over time, the focus has always
been on market access through  a reduction in trade barriers and the abolition of discrimination
among  products, be it through  border measures  or 'domestic' policies. By reducing  trade barriers
the costs for foreign  producers to contest  markets  decline. Similarly,  the obligation  to bind tariffs
6In what follows  competition  policy-related  disputes  are defined  as disputes  relating  to either the non-existence
or non-enforcement  of competition  policy,  or to  the enforcement  of such  policies. An antitrust  exemption  is an  example
of enforcement  that might give rise to a dispute.4
can provide  exporters with greater certainty  regarding  market access conditions,  as GATT rules
allow  contracting  parties to contest  measures  employed  by another contracting  party that nullify
or impair such bindings. Trade liberalization  is a fundamental  component  of any policy  that seeks
to ensure that markets are competitive  (Blackhurst, 1991). In t).eory, of cours^, free trade is
neither necessary  nor sufficient  to ensure competitive  outcomes. It is not necessary  because in
principle other policies - i.e.,  competition  policy - can be used to achieve the sanme  outcome.
But in such  cases  competition  policy  will to a large  extent  be compensating  for the anti-competitive
effects induced  by the trade barriers that are maintained. Abolition  of the trade barriers would
be a much more effective  and lower cost method  of fostering competitive  outcomes. Free trade
may not be sufficient  if foreign firms heve  global market power, foreign suppliers collude with
each other and/or with domestic producers, or if relevant markets are local (i.e, products are
nontradable)  and there  are restrictions  on inward  foreign  direct  investment. Domestic  competition
laws will generally  be required to complement  free trade in order to ensure competitive  conduct.'
While free trade may not be sufficient to guarantee competitive  conduct on individual
markets, it is an efficient means of fostering competition. One of the fiundamental  (; jectives
underlying the GATT can therefore be argued to be competition,  even though the Preamble to
the GATT does not explicitly mention competition as a goal.  Not only do GA1T rules and
procedures foster competition  on product markets, but they also promote competition  between
regulatory  regimes. The General  Agreement  applies  to trade  policies  and policies  having  an impact
on international  trade flows. It seeks to establish  the competitive  conditions  on the basis of which
firms  from contracting  parties  compete  in world trade. Endowments  and those  aspects  of member
country regulatory regimes that are not subjected to agreed disciplines  are taken as given, the
implicit premise being that nations compete on the basis of these.
Two ideal types or  'models'  for reciprocal liberalization of  market access can be
distinguished. The first can be called 'free market access' and is premised  on the maintenance
of national sovereignty  regarding non-border policies.  In such a world there is free trade and
fret4om to engage  in foreign  direct investment. Countries  remain sovereign,  but do not pursue
7 See Boner and Krueger  (1991). This is also the case if not only trade, but also inward  direct investment  is
unconstrained.  Concerns  relating  to foreign  collusion  are generally  overstated,  as are the difficulties  of maintaining
the stability  of cartels and the reach of na.ional antitrust laws.5
any discriminatory  regulation  of foreign  products  or producers, and compete  on the basis of their
natural endowments  and regulatory  regimes. Given  the sovereignty  constrairit,  some  economists
have  argued  that  this is the optimal  institutional  structure  (Corden, 1987;  SEiape,  1987). The second
model is one whe.a govemments seek to further integrate their economies  and are willing to
cooperate  on various domestic  regulatory  policies. In practice  the first model  can be only observed
- albeit often imperfectly  - in federal states, whereas the EC is an (also imperfect) example of
the second model.  In the literature the approaches  underlying  these two models  are sometimes
described  by the terms negative  and  positive  integration,  the first implying  that  governments  agree
not to do certain things, the second that they agree to do certain things. 8
Economic  integration  is not thi-  objective  of GATT, nor is 'free market  access'. However,
conceptually  it is much closer to tne first than to the second model, as negative integration
predominates. The most  binding  disciplines  that  are imposed  pertain  to measures  taken  or enforced
at a country's border. With respect to other regulations  and policies  contracting  parties largely
retain their sovereignty. The approac!i taken towards non-border policies is  simply to seek
agreement  to reduce  or eliminate  discrimination,  and to establish  procedures  une  tr which  parties
may seek compensation  for actions  of other governments  that nullify or impair existing market
access conditions. The GAIT approach  has been  quite successful  in greatly reducing  tariffs, and
has allowed contracting  parties to make steady progress on reducing the discriminatory  impact
of other policies. The key element  is usually  agreement  not to use certain measures  or to follow
specific  procedures when implementing  various policies.
But, disciplines  in many  areas remain  quite limited. Govemments  continue  to have  a great
deal of latitude to impose  trade restrictions  or Pr :sue other policies  that  reduce the contestability
of domestic  markets. Notwithstanding  the progress that  has been  achieved  thus far in the Uruguay
Round, implementation  of the existing draft agreements  would not come close to ensuring free
trade, let alone free market access. 9 In large part this is because  contingent  protection remains
relatively  readily  accessible  to import-competing  firms. Although  procedural  changes  in the Anti-
Dumping  Code reduce discretion  with respect to methodologies  used to determine  dumping and
8 See Hoekman  (1993) for further discussion and  references to the literature.
9  See GAIT  (1992) for a summary  of ali the draft agreements.6
injury margins, many  of the opportunities  provided  by existing  rules for adopting  procedures  with
a protectionist bias remain untouched. The proposed revisions to the rules do not mandate  that
economy-wide  implication@  (iiicluding  consumer interests or domestic competition  aspects) be
taken  into account  in investigations.  Antidumping  is likely  to remain  an oft invoked  escape  clause.
The draft Uruguay Round  agreement on safeguards  (Article XIX) will do little to induce firms
to shift away from using antioG  rniping,  even though it goes some  way towards incorporating  the
status quo into the GATT.  The,  draft agreement  requires all existing voluntary  export restraint
agreements (VERs) to be notified  and abolished  or converted into GATT-consistent  measures
within 4 years. 10 It allows for selectivity  if imports from some countries are shown to have
increased  "disproportionately"  in relation  to the total  increase  in imports  of the  product  concerned,
allows for quotas to be imposed, provides the option t.iat quotas be administered  by exporters,
and eliminates  compensation  for affected  exporting countries for three years.  The revisions to
Article XIX therefore  basically  imply that VER-type  actions  would  become  feasible  under  GATI
auspices, albeit subject to time limits (maximum  du.ation of 8 years) and degressivity. Greater
use can therefore be expected  of GATT's general safeguard  mechanism. While not necessarily
reducing  the use of QRs or antidumping  actions, the  agreement  would  lead  to greater transparency
of trade policies.
It is important to recall the paradoxes  that characterize  antidumping. Article VI of the
GATT - which is the only GATT provision to deal with governmenta!  measures  (antidumping)
intended  to offset perceived  private anticompetitive  behaviour (dumping)  - is the GATT Article
most directly related to competition  policy  concerns. Although  fk-mally  taken by governments,
antidumping  investigations  are initiated  by private entities  and can therefore  be seen as a GAIT-
legal means for private parties to seek the implementation  of government-enforced  restrictions
on competition. It is well documented  that antidumping  may facilitate  (tacit) collusion  between
import-competing  firms  in the  administering  country,  between  compe.itors  located  in the different
countries  producing  similar  goods, and the possible  cascading  of protection  along  the production
'° Contracting  parties may each keep one measure in effect until the end of 1999.7
stream within a particular country."'  Antidumping,  far from being a pro-competitive  practiec,
is an anti-competitive  one.  Empirical studies have demonstrated  that antidumping  actiorns  ha e
a significant  impact in terms of reducing competition  in affected markets. Thus, antidumping
tends  to promote the result it is supposed  to combat: less rather than more competitive  pricing." 2
While antidu.nping  is a major loophole in the GAIT  in reducing the contestability  of
markets,  it iS by no means  the only one. Other policy  areas wvhere  attention  coil.  I  ruitf.illy  focus
include  negotiating  further disciplines  on agriLultural  support policies,  governmeit procurement,
subsidies,  policies  restricting  access in service  markets,  and strengthening  dispute  settlement  and
enforcement  procedures. Moreover, there may  be a need to expand  disciplines  to cover policies
affecting foreign direct investment, an area that will remain substantially  outside the scope of
the post-Uruguay  Round  trading system. Space  consideration-  prohibit a discussion of all these
issues. The question of interest here is where the negotiation  of competition  policy disciplines
should rank in comparison to these other issues.  This can only be answered subjectively. We
believe it should not rank very highly, especially  given the potential  reach of existing GAIT
disciplines  and  procedures  (see  Section  III) and the magnitude  of other 'holes' in the GAIT, unless
an explicit link is made with the abolition of antidumping  provisions.
Experience  demonstrates  that  multilateral  agreement  on the ,doption of common  competition
policies and abolition of antidumping  is difficult to achieve.  Where it has proven possible, it
occurred irn  a bilateral or regional setting.  The two regional arrangements where cooperation
on antitrust  proved  possible  -the EC/European  Economic  Area  and the Closer  Economic  Relations
(CER)  Agreement  between  Australia  and New Zealand  - entail  far-reaching  liberalization  of trade
in goods, services  and factors of production,  as well as govmrnment  procurement  and state aids
(su,sidies).  The NAFTA, in contrast, does not contain disciplines  on subsidies  that go beyond
those  of the GATT, does  not imply common  antitrust  rules or enforcement,  and continues  to allow
"See Hoekmnan  and Leidy  (1992) for a discussion  of cascading. The Tokyo  Round  antidumping  code  explicitly
requires that  in determining  whether  dumped  imports  are causing  material  injury the existence  of restrictive  business
practices  be taken  into  account. If injury is due  to a restrictive  practice  pursued  by the  domestic  industry,  any resulting
'self-inflicted' injury is not to be attributed  to dumped imports  (Agreement  on the Implementation  of Article VI of
the General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade, Art,3:4).  However, this provision  has had little effect in practice
(Meszerlin, 1990b).
12 See, e.g.,  Finger (1993), Messerlin  (1989, 1990a), Stern (1993) and Tharakan  (1991).8
for antidumping. The regional experience  suggests  that harmonization  of antitrust  and aboliEion
of antidumping  not only requires concurrent, if not prior, agreement to eliminate trade and
investment  restrictions ('free mrrarket  access'), but also the adoption of common disciplines  on
the use of state aids.
In contrast to seeking furtfer liberalization of trade/FDI, the pursuit of  multilateral
competition rules involves coordinating/iarmonizin- regulations. This in turn opens up the
possibility that the proe'ss  is captured by specific industry or government interests,13  and/or
allows  gl'vernments  that  are  more  interested  in  regulating  than  freeing  irnternational
trada/competi'tion  to seek to attain their objectives in a less than transparent manner.  The
probability  of regulatory  capture  is non-negligible,  as demonstrated  4he  apparent  intent of the EC
Commission  to allow  iapanese  car producers  to enforce  negotiated  market  share 'forecasts' through
a relaxation  of El? competition  disciplines  (Matoo  and Mavroidis, 1993). The mere fact  that some
of the governments  seeking  multilateral  disciplines  on business  pracfices  apparently  are not  prepared
to invoke  provisions of GATT that could, in principle, curb some of these practices, suggests
that conipetition  may well be the liser.  More generally, existing antitrust  rules and procedures
differ widely  across jurisdictions.  In part this reflects different concerns with and approaches
to the regulatory  capture  problem. Such  differences  are likely  to prove to be an additional  obstacle
to reaching multilateral  agreement on competition  policies.
It is also important  to keep  in mind  that the  political  economy  of cooperation  on compediion
policies is likely to be different from more traditional  trade liberalization. GATT negotiating
rounds have been motivated  by public choice  rationales: they allowed liberalization  to occur by
inducing  export-oriented  industries, firms  desiring  to have  access  to lower  cost, foreign-produced
intermediates, and consumer groups to offset the political  power of protected  import competing
interest groups. The bindir., ,onstraint  on liberalization  was more  political than economic:  few
countries maintained 'optimal' tariffs.  But the economic cost of coordinated  application or
harmonization of competition policy may be non-negligible.  For  example, the exertion of
mon(opsony  power by importing firns  in a country over exporters may benefit the country as a
whole.  Exporters may want to see antitrust rules enforced  on such monopsonists,  but this will
1' See Neven et al. (1993) for a review of the literature  on regulatory capture in the antitrust context.9
not be in the interest of the government concerned. Incentives  may be similarly skewed with
respect to the exercise of market power by firms on export markets.  Assuming appropriatc
competition  policies are enforced regarding the behavior of these firms in their home market,
the incentives for the exporters' government  to regulate behavior on export markets is low, as
suchA  behavior can be argued to be in the nation's interest. It is then unclear where the internal
politicai  pressure or support for preventing  the exercise  of market  power on foreign markets  will
come from.  Of course, a case can be made that there wi. be global efficiency  gains from such
an extension of antitrust, and that each country will share in such gains as long as enough
governments  cooperate (Caves, 1987). The problem with this from a practic?.l  perspective is
that the distribution  an,' magnitude  of such  gains axe  uncertain  and accrue to consumers. These
have little inflijence  in domestic  political markets of exporting  countries.  It is no accidert that
the regulation  of behavior  by firms  on export  markets  and  policies  by gvernments affecting  exports
(e.g., export taxes)  are not addressed  by GATT.  1
4 Importing  countries  that  face  firms with market
power  are likely to better  off by ensuring  that  their  markets  are truly  open -thus  confronting  export
monopolies  or cartels with competition,  or the threat thereof - and by applying  national  antitrust
to the extent possible.
The foregoing  arguments  imply that  negctiations  must  first center  on attaining  the necessary
conditions - free or at least substantially  freer market access - before pursuit of harmonization
of antitrust becomes  a realistic proposition. Even seeking 'only' the coordinated  application  of
competition  rules presuipposes  agreement  on common  objectives. I his has been and continues
to be lacking  in ti;e  GATr context,  which  is why  international  cooperation  on commercial  policies
has been mostly  limited  to 'negative  integration' - i.e., agreement  not to pursue specific  policies.
Realistically  the most that can be expected  in the multilateral  context are further moves towards
satisfying  the necessary  conditions,  i.e., attaining  the first 'ideal' model  described  earlier, perhaps
with GAB's  enforcement/dispute  settlement  mechanism  extended  to include certain  competition
policy-related  disputes.  The degree to which  such extension is required may be rather minor.
As discussed  at length  in the next  Section,  GATT already  provides substantial  scope  to raise such
14 See Auquier  and  Caves  (1979) for a discussion  of the exemption  from competition  policy  of 'rent extracting'
behavior  by  home  country  firms  on  export  markets,  as well as  the  optimal  policy  that  should  be pursued  by  the  home
country.10
disputes.
LII. Applying the GAIT  to Competition Policy-related Disputes
GATT  deals  only  with government  policies. Anti-competitive  practices  pursued  by private
entities  are therefore  not subJect  to GATT. While this is no doubt  one  of the rationales  underlying
calls for GATT  to address  competition  policy,  in many  instances  anti-competitive  business  practices
of firms will need  both government  approval  (e.g., an antitrust  exemption)  and government  support
(e.g., trade barriers).  If a contracting  party supports business practices that lead to defacto if
not dejure discrimination  against foreign  products GATT  dispute settlement  procedures may be
invoked.  Measures that  are  inconsistent with Article  III  (National Treatment) or  with
complementary  rules on state-trading  enterprises  and quantitative  restrictions  (Articles  XVII  and
XI), may give rise to a 'violation' complaint (under Art. XXIII:l(a)).  Measures that are not
inconsistent  with the General Agreement,  but nullify  or impair an existing concession  may give
rise to a so-called 'non-violation' complaint  (under Art. XXIII:  1(b)). It should be noted at the
outset that much  of what follows  is not specific  to competition  policy  legislation,  this simply  being
one type of instrument that may violate GAIT  obligations.
Article IIM:  National Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation
Article III  is  one of  the  key provisions in  the General Agreement, requiring that
Government's guarantee that domestic and imported products are treated equally, apart from
whatever  forms  of discrimination  against  foreign  like  products  are allowed  by other  GATT  Articles
(e.g., a tariff). Equal treatment  is not necessarily  guaranteed  through  the application  of identical
legal provisions, as this might lead to defacto discrimination  in favour of domestic  products.
Panels have  interpreted Art.III as an obligation  of result:  contracting  parties have  discretion  how
to implement  Art.III. But  whatever  means  are chosen  must  result  in treatment  of imported  products
no less favourable than that accorded domestic ones.' 5 As Art.III purports to guarantee the
equality  of competitive  conditions, GAIT Panels have pronounced  that trade effects are totally
" It is upon the contracting  party applying  differential  treatment  to show that, in spite of such differences,  the
no less favourable  treatment  standard of Art.111  is met. 'US-Section  337' Panel Report, GATT Basic  Instruments
and Selected Documents  (hereafter  BISD) 36S/387, §5.  11.11
irrelevant in this context. 16 Moreover, Art.III applies irrespective of whether a specific tariff
commitment  has been undertaken  by the importing contracting  party,' 7 therefore applies to all
imports, and does so on a product-by-product  basis." 8 Although not spelled out explicitly, it
goes without  saying  that  national  treatment  can be guaranteed  only in the territory of the importing
contracting  party. Equally  obvious,  if there  is no domestic  production,  Article  III does  not apply.  19
Finally, the mere existence  of mandatory  legislation  may  violate  Art.III, as may  the mere  exposure
to the risk  that national  treatment  will not be guaranteed  has been  judged as GATT-inconsistent. 20
Art.III distinguishes  between  policies  involving  charges  (fees and taxes)  and 'non-charge'
policies. Art.III:2 pertains to internal  taxes or other charges applied  directly  or indirectly  to like
domestic  products, whereas  Art.III:4 speaks of all laws, regulations  and requirements  affecting
the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,  distribution  or use of like domestic
products.  The term 'like products' denotes  directly competitive  or substitutable  products. See
the Interpretive  Note to Art.III. To the extent  that domestic  antitruF,  laws affect  the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase,  transportation,  distiibution  or use of products, they  can be considered
6IhIus, a recent  Panel  Report  stated  that:  'Art.I11:2  protects  competitive  conditions  between  imported  and domestic
products  but does not protect  expectations  on export volume ... is not conditional  on a 'trade effects test' nor is it
qualified  by a minimum  standard,' 'US- Measures  Affecting  Alcoholic  and Malt Beverages' DS32/R, adopted 19
June 1992, §5.6.  The same Panel Report  subsequently  makes a similar argument  with respect to Art.III:4.  This
conclusion  with respect to Art.III:2 was already reached in 'Brazilian  Intemal Taxes' GATT/CP.3/42,  adopted on
30 June 1949, Vol.II/185, §16.
" See GATT Doc. GATT/SP.3/42,  adopted  on 30 June 1949, 11/181-4.
Is Arguments  that Art.lIl only require that on average imported  and domestic  products  be treated in the same
way have been rejected on the basis that this would lead to great uncertainty  about the conditions  of competition
between  imported  and domestic  products  and thus defeat  the purposes  of Art.lll.  See Panel Report  on 'US-Section
337 of the Tariff Act of 1930', L/6439, adopted  on 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/387, §5.14.
19  See  Panel Report  on 'Canada-Administration  of the  Foreign Investment  Review  Act  (FIRA)',  L/5504, adopted
on 25 June 1983, BISD 30S/159, §§5.9-5.11.
X On the first, see 'US-Taxes  on Petroleum' BISD  34S/160§5.2.9,  and 'EEC-Regulation  on Imports of Parts'
BISD  37S/132,  §5.25-5.26;  'Thailand-Restrictions  on Importation  of and Inteinal  Taxes  on Cigarettes'  DS  10/2, adopted
on 7 November 1990, BISD 37S/227, §86-88;  and more recently, 'US-Measures  Affecting' DS32/R, adopted 19
June 1992,  §5.3.9. The existence  of potentially  GATI-inconsistent  national  legislation  that  is not mandatorily  applied  -
i.e., application  is left to the discretion  of contracting  parties -is not  necessarily  a violation  of the national  treatment
rule. On the second,  a recent  Panel Report  concluded  that 'purchase  regulations  creating  svch  a risk  must  be considered
to be according  less favourable  treatment  within  the meaning  of Article  111:4.' 'EEC-Payments  and Subsidies  paid
to Processors  and Producers of Oilseeds  and Related  Animal Feed Proteins.' See L/6627, adopted  on 25 January
1990, BISD 37S/124-125, §§137-141  (emphasis  added).12
as non-charge  elements.  Both provisions must be interpreted the same way:
Art.III:2 ... protect[s]  expectations  on the competitive  relationship  between  imported  and
domestic  products.  Art.III:4, which is the parallel provision of Art.lll  dealing with the
non- charge elements  of internal legislation, has to be construed as serving the same
purpose. Article  m:4  would  not serve  this  purpose  if [an  other]  interpretation  were  adopted,
since a 'aw, regulation  or requirement  could then only be challenged  in GATI  after the
event as a means of rectifying  less favourable  treatment  of imported  products rather  than
as a means offorestalling it. 2"
Thus, 'non-charge  policies' must be applied  in a non-discriminatory  way to like products,
and GAIr  contracting  parties must guarantee  ex ante, rather than  expost, competitive  conditions
between imported and  domestic products.  Article 111:4  pertains to  laws,  regulations or
requirements. GATT Panels have concluded  that 'requirements' comprise  not only those which
an enterprise is legally  bound to carry out, but also those  which an enterprise voluntarily  accepts
in order to obtain an advantage from the government.Y
Practices that have been examined  under Article III
A number  of competition  policy-related  disputes  where  it was  alleged  that  certain  measures
violated  Art.III have  been  brought  to GAIT.  Examples  include  impediments  in distribution  such
as discriminatory  offer of points  of sale, marketing  requirements,  and  pricing  policies. With respect
to measures  affecting  the distribution  of imported  products, a 1992  Panel Report concluded  that
a U.S. requirement  that imported  beer and wine be sold  only through  in-state wholesalers  or other
middlemen  was contrary to Art.III:4, as some  domestic  like products were permitted to be sold
directly to retailers.23 A Canadian  requirement that foreign investors were to buy exclusively
21 Panel Report on 'US-section 337', BISD 36S/387, §5.11-5.13, emphasis  added.
I  See  the Panel Report  on 'EEC-Regulation  on Imports  of Parts  and Components', L/66  17,  adopted  on 16  May
1970, BISD 37S/132 §5.21. The expansive  interpretation  of the word 'requirement' could be based on the term
'affecting' used in Art.III:4. There  has been a coherent  approach  by GAIT panels dealing  with the interpretation
of Art.III:4.  A 1958 GATT panel first stated: 'the text of paragraph 4 referred ...  to laws and regulations  and
requirements  affecting  internal sale, purchase, etc., and not to laws, regulations  and requirements  governing  the
conditions  of sale or purchase. The selection  of the world 'affecting' would  imply  ... that  the drafters  of the Article
intended to cover in paragraph  4 not only the laws and regulations  which directly  governed the conditions  of sale
or purchase but also any laws or regulations  which might adversely  modify  the conditions  of competition  between
the domestic  and imported  products  on the material  market.' Panel Report  on Italian Discrimination,  BISD  7S/60,
§11-13  (emphasis  added).
2  'US-Measures  Affecting Alcobolic  and Malt Beverages' DS32/R, adopted 19 June 1992, §5.30 - §5.33.13
from Canadian suppliers was also deemed to be inconsistent  with Art.III:4.Y4
Another Panel Report noted that by allowing  domestic beer access to points of sale not
available to imported  beer, Canada  accorded domestic  beer competitive  opportunities  denied to
imported beer in a manner inconsistent  with Art.III:4.  In this case, imported beer had to be
delivered  by/through  the Canadian  liquor boards, while  domestic  beer could  use private delivery.
Although  Canada argued that  in this respect liquor boards were operating  on a commercial  basis
(see the Article XVII discussion below), the Panel concluded  that this requirement was also
inconsistent with Art.III:4.  This Panel also dealt with packaging  requirements  vricing
restrictions. On  the former, Canada  required  that  imported  beer  be shipped  in six-pacr rnri.ai:;rs.
As this affected  sales  in outlets  where  six-packs  were not offered  for sale, the Panel  aga.  .. a,luded
that this requirement was inconsistent  with Art.  III.  With respect to pricing policies, ttd  . a  el
stated that the maintenance  by an import and sales monopoly  of a minimum  price for an imported
product at a level at which a directly competing, higher-priced  domestic  product was supplied
was also inconsistent  with Art.III:4."1
Various measures  irmplying  discriminatory  access to distribution systems have therefore
been found to be inconsistent  with GAIT obligations. The foregoing measures  qualify as 'non-
charge' policies  and thus fall under the scope  of Art.III:4.  If such discrimination  is inconsistent
with the importing  country's competition  law, the matter  raised by the exporting  contracting  party
indirectly  concems the non-enforcement  of such law.  If it is not inconsistent  - e.g., because of
an antitrust exemption  - the resulting discrimination  can nonetheless  be addressed in GATT. 26
In practice,  a concern  that  is often  raised regarding  the  contestability  of markets  relates to antitrust
exemptions  and domestic  monopolies/cartels.  Neither  are GATI-inconsistent  perse,  but  the latter
are subject to GAIT  non-discrimination  disciplines. These are laid out in Article XVII.
24 Panel Report on "Canada-Administration  of the FIRA' BISD 30S/160, §5.9-§5.11.
25 'Canada-Import,  Distribution  .. ' DS17/R, adopted  on 18 February 1992, §5.5; §5.12-§5.14; §5.4;  §5.30.
Maximum-price  requirements in the context of the Panel Report on "US-Measures  Affecting  ..."  have also been
found to be GAIT-inconsistent, §5.59.
26  As Sir Leon Brittan  lucidly  puts it: 'we cannot seriously  expect  the authorities  in our export markets  to stand
back and bless these  authorized  activities  merely  because  we have exercised  our  jurisdiction"  (Brittan, 1991,  p. 4).14
Article XVII: State-Trading  Enterprises
Art.XVII pertains to: (i) state-owned  enterprises, (Art.XVII:  la); (ii) any enterprise that
has been granted formally or in effect exclusive  or special  privileges (XVII:  la); (iii) marketing
boards (Interpretive  Note, Art.XVII:  1); (iv) any enterprise under  thejurisdiction of a contracting
party (XVII:  Ic); and (v) import monopolies  (XVII:4b).27 The right of contracting  parties to
maintain  or establish  state-trading  enterprises  or to offer exclusive  privileges  is not at allprejudged
by the General Agreement. 28 The basic obligation  imposed on contracting  parties is that they
should  ensure that the enterprises covered by Art.XVII not act in a manner inconsistent  with the
general  principle of non-discrimination. 29 The crucial  question  is what is meant  by the reference
to non-discrimination  - only MFN, or national  treatment  as well. While  the MFN obligation  applies
unambiguously,  an early Panel concluded  that  national  treatment  was not covered. 30 Subsequent
Panels reaffirmed  this, albeit in a more qualified manner. 3"  However, a recent Panel concluded
that a contracting  party's right to establish  an import and sales (distribution)  monopoly  does not
27  Panel Report on 'Notification of State-trading  enterprises", L/970, adopted on 13 May 1959/142. Import
monopolies  are also dealt  with in Art.II:4 which  limits  the level of protection  to that  implied  by the relevant schedule
of tariff concessions. Art.II:4 speaks of monopolies  maintained  or authorized  formally or in effect, a verbatim
reproduction  of Art.31 ofthe Havana  Charter, inthe lightofwhich  it has  tobe interpreted  (Interpretive  NoteArt.II:4).
The  words 'in effect' suggest  that private  enterprises  that have effectively  developed  an import monopoly  may also
be covered to the extent that no government  action has been taken to dismantle  them (e.g., via the application  of
domestic  antitrust). See also Jackson (1969, p. 355) on this point.
I  As noted by the Committee  on the Legal and Institutional  Framework  of the GATT: 'nothing in the General
Agreement  prevents  a contracting  party  from establishing  or maintaining  state trading  enterprises,  nor does the General
Agreement  sanction  discrimination  against state trading enterprises  which are, in this regard, placed on the same
basis as any other entcrprise". L/2281, §9-10.
9  Art.XVII:1.  See also Preparatory  Work, Geneva, EPCT/160, §5-6; EPCT/A/PV.14. Even in the context
of the Havana  Charter a parallelism  was sought between  private firms  and state-trading  enterprises  by the drafters,
see  Jackson  (1969),  p. 334. Art.XVII:  l(b) does  not establish  a separate  legal obligation,  but  provides  the mechanism
for the implementation  of the obligation  contained  in Art.XVII:  1(a). Panel Report  on 'Canada-Administration  of
the FIRA," BISD 30S/163, §5.16.
3  See  Jackson  (1969),  p. 346  on MFN. The Panel report  onA  'Belgian Family  Allowances' decided  that  the scope
of Art.XVII 'did not extend to matters dealt with in Art.III." G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD IS/59, §4.
31 'Canada-Administration  of the FIRA' BISD  30S/16S,  §5.16:  "[TMhe  Panel  saw great force  in Canada's  argument
that only the most-favoured-nation  and not the national treatment  obligations  fall within the scope of the general
principles  referred to in Art.XVII:  1(a). However,  the Panel did not consider  it necessary  to decide  in this particular
case whether the general reference to the principles  on nondiscriminatory  treatment  referred  to in Art.XVII:  1 also
comprises  the national  treatment  principle  since  it had already  found  the purchase  undertakings  at issue  to be inconsistent
with Art.III:4. "15
entail  the right  to discriminate  against  imported  products  inconsistently  with Art.IHI:4." If national
treatment  were not  to apply  in the  context  of import-cum-distribution  monopolies,  then  contracting
parties would  have an incentive  to have recourse to such  monopolies  and circumvent  their Art.III
obligations.
Three qualitatively  different legal  obligations  are imposed  by Art.XVII, depending  on the
type of entity involved.  First, as far as import monopolies  are concerned, cort-acting parties
are obliged  (upon  request  of contracting  parties  having  a substantial  trace in the  Frorluct  concerned)
to "inform  the CONTRACTING  PARTIES  of the import mark-up  on the product  during a recent
representative  period, or, when it is not possible to do so, of the price charged on the resale of
the  product"'.  Second,  in their  purchases  or sales  involving  either  imports  or exports, state-owned
enterprises, marketing boards and enterprises granted exclusive privileges (whether de jure or
defacto), contracting  parties  must  ensure  that  such firms  act in a manner  consistent  with the general
principles  of non-discriminatory  treatment  presc.ibed in the General  Agreement  for governn 1 Cntal
measures  affecting  imports or exports by private traders (Art.XVII:  1(a)). Given  the applicability
of the non-discrimination  principle  in the context  of Art.  XVII, there is arguably  a parallel between
'govemmental  measures' and 'alllaws, regulations  andrequirements'  of Art.III:4. Consequently,
the obligation imposed on contracting parties in respect of the three aforementioned  types of
categories  of enterprises should read as follows: a contracting  party should abide by the non-
discrimination  principie  in respect  of governmental  measures  (be  it laws, regulations  or requirements
in the sense of Art.III:4) that  affect imports  or exports by private traders (that  is, not  only directly
governs,  but also might  adversely  modify  the  conditions  of competition).  This is a clear  obligation
32 Panel Report  'Canada-Import,  Distribution'  DSl7/R,  adopted on 18 February  1992, §5.15.  In this case the
measure in question was a Canadian regulation affecting the internal transportation of beer.  An earlier, related, Panel
recognized that there was 'great  force in the argument that Art. 111:4  was also applicable to state-trading enterprises
at least when the monopoly of the importation and monopoly of the distribution in domestic markets were combined.
This interpretation  was confirmed a  conrrario  by the wording of Art.  II  8(a),"' Canada-Import, Distribution..'  L/6304,
adopted on 22 March  1988, BISD 35S/90, §4.26.  Art.111:8(a)  states that laws, regulations or requirements relating
to government procurement of products for governmental use (i.e., not for resale) are not subject to national treatment.
For those contracting parties that are signatories of the government procurement code,  strengthened disciplines are
provided in that context. The words 'at least'  suggest that whenever the activities of a monopoly have an effect on
the treatment of imported products,  Art.1II applies. It remains to be determined in future GAT7 case-law precisely
what effects are  relevant.
3  See Art.XVII:4b.  CONTRACTINGPARTIESrefers  toallcontracting  partiesactingjointly.  Thisrequirement
pertains only to products  where no tariff concessions have been negotiated.16
of result: contracting  parties are free to adopt any measure  provided that it is consistent  with the
principle embodied  in Art.III.14  Third, Art.XVII:  l(c) requires contracting  parties to ensure that
no enterprises under their jurisdiction be prevented from acting in accordance with the non-
discrimination  principle. 35 This means  that  there is nopositive obligation  imposed  on contracting
parties to ensure that private enterprises act in conformity  with the principle. Private enterprises
are permitted  to behave in an Art.III inconsistent  way.  It is not the action of private enterprises
but the action of governments  that is a matter of concern in Art.XVII. 36
Article XI: Elimination  of Quantitative  Restrictions
Quantitative  restrictions (QRs) are relevant  in the context of this pap  2r because they are
frequently used by firms to restrict market access, but are enforced by governments. Articles
XI-XIV provide the legal framework addressing QRs: Article XI forbids QRs; Article XII
exceptionally  permits QRs used for balance-of-payments  (BOP) reasons; Article XIII requires
that such QRs apply on a nondiscriminatory  (erga omnes)  basis; and Article XIV provides that
if QRs are applied for BOP reasons the nondiscrimination  requirement may be waived  by the
CONTRACTING  PARTIES  (Jackson,  1969,  p. 308). The basic obligation  imposed  on contracting
parties in Art.XI: 1 is to refrain from introducing  or maintaining  QRs.37  Import quotas  constitute
34 Firms  granted exclusive  privileges  are also to make  purchases  or sales solely in accordance  with  commercial
considerations.  An interpretive note states that 'the  :harging  by a state enterprise of different  prices for its sales
of a product in different markets  is not precluded [by Art.XVII], provided  that such different prices are charged
for commercial  reasons, to meet conditions  of supply and demand in export markets.'  See also Dam (1970).
M The applicability  of the non-discrimination  principle  in the context of Art:XVII:  I(c) was  acknowledged  in the
Panel Report on 'Canada-Administration  of the FIRA', BISD 30S/159, §5.  16,
36 As Jackson  (1969, p. 330)  points  out, if all private  firms  in  a contracting  party  decide  to cease  sales  or purchases
across their national border, then the flow of international  trade for that country might dry up but no violation  of
the GAIT would have occurred.
37  Article  XI:  1  states: 'No prohibitions  or restrictions  other  than duties, taxes  or other  charges. whether made
effective  through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted  or maintained  by any
contracting  party  on the importation  of any  product  of the territory  of any other  contracting  party  or on the  exportation
or sale for export of any product destined  for the territory of any other contracting  party'.  Article XI:2 lists the
permissible  exceptions.17
import restrictions within the meaning of Article XI:  1 whether or not they actually impede
imports. 3 Art.XI is therefore similar to Art.III in that its purpose is to establish competitive
conditions,  independent  of trade effects. However,  Arts.III and XI differ in two respects. First,
the only obligation that can be imposed regarding QRs is nondiscrimination  between foreign
products. The question  of discrimination  between  domestic  and imported  produ Is  does not  come
into play. Second,  whereas  Art.III:4 deals with "all laws, regulation  or requirements"  that might
lead to treatment  less favourable  to imported  products  than  that  accorded  to domestic  ones, Art.XI
addresses "prohibitions  or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made
effective  through quotas, impoit or export licences or other measures".
While the terms quotas, import and export licences  are unambiguous,  this cannot be said
for 'measures'.  A recent GATT-panel  noted that measures must be governmental  and that the
drafting history of the GAIT  suggested that the drafters were primarily concerned  with the
effectiveness  of the measures. 39 The Panel therefore did not feel bound  by the legal qualification
of the measure in question, but focused its attention  on its effect.  In this case the measure in
question  was a non-mandatory  "administrative  guidance"  by MITI, based on consensus  and  peer
pressure.  While the Panel found that this was a measure under Article XI, it emphasized  that
its conclusion was limited to this specific case and should not be construed to encompass all
'administrative  guidance'.  Another Panel concluded  that in determining  whether specific  non-
mandatory  measures  contravene  Article XI, two  criteria  have  to be satisfied:  "First, [the  existence
ofl reasonable grounds to believe that sufficient incentives or disincentives  existed for non-
mandatory  measures  to take  effect. Second,  [that]  the operation  of the measures  to restrict exports
[is] essentially  dependent  on Government  action  or intervention". 40 Non-mandatory  government
35  wThe  mere existence of a QR is presumed  to cause nullification  or impairment  not only because  of its trade
effects  but also because  it would  lead to increased  transaction  costs  and  would  create uncertainties  which  could  affect
investment  plans,  "'EEC-Payments  and Subsidies  to Processors  and Producers  of Oilseeds  and Related  Animal-Feed
Proteins',  L/6627,  adopted  on 25 January 1990,  BISD  37S/86  and 'Japanese  Measures  on Imports  of Leather', adopted
on 15/16 N.ay 1984, BISD 31S/113. See also 'Brazilian Import Taxes', adopted on 30 June 1949, Vol.11/184-5.
39  See "Japan-Restrictions  on Imports  of Certain Agricultural  Products",  adopted on 22 March 1988, L/6253,
BISD 35S/242, §5.4.1.4.
4  'Japan-Trade in Semiconductors',  adopted  on 4 May 1988,  L/6309, BISD  35S/153-4,  pp. 154-5, §§108-109.
The matter of concern was a minimum  export price that the Panel found to operate in the form of a mandatory
requirement.18
measures can accordingly  violate Article XI.
A number of measures  have been found to be inconsistent  with Article XI: 1: (1) a clause
in the legislation  of the United States which  prohibited, with certain exceptions,  the importation
or public  distribution  in the U.S. of a copyrighted  work consisting  preponderantly  of non-dramatic
literary material in the English language;" (2) the provisionz of the U.S.  Marine Mammal
Protection  Act that  prohibit  imports  of tuna  if harvested  in a way  that  does not  respect the standards
imposed by  the  legislation; 42 (3)  minimum import price  systems (enforced by  additional
security);' 3 and (4) minimum  export price systems.44
The General  Agreement  also recognizes  that  QRs may  be used by state-trading  enterprises.
An  Interpretative  Note in this regard states  that  throughout  Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV  and XVIII,
the terms import or export restrictions  include restrictions made effective  through state trading
operations. The Note refers to 'restrictions made effective  through  State-trading  operations' and
not to 'import restrictions' in an attempt to ensure that contvacting  parties cannot escape their
obligations  with respect to private trade by establishing state-trading  operations.4 5
Non-violation: Article XXm  on Nullification and Impairment
The foregoing  has looked  at relevant  specific  GAIT obligations. We now turn to GATT's
dispute settlement  procedures, which are broader in scope.  There are three grounds for a
contracting  party to invoke  GATT dispute  settlement  procedures  and claim that  benefits  accruing
41"US-Manufacturing  Clause", L/5609, adopted  on 15/16 May 1984, BISD 315/91, §42(i).
42"US-Restrictions  on Imports of Tuna,  DS21/R  (unadopted),  §§5.17, 5.18, 5.36.
43"EEC-Programme  of Minimum  Import  Prices, Licences  and Society  Deposits  for Certain Processed  Fruits  and
Veg'etables",  L/4687, adopted  on 18 October 1978, BISD  25S/99-100, §4.9.
""Japan-Trade in Semi-conductors",  BISD  35S/153, §105.
45 As explained  in a GATl-panel:  bthis  was a recognition  of the fact the in the case of enterprises  enjoying  a
monopoly  of both  importation  and distribution  in the domestic  market, the distinction  normally  made  in the General
Agreement  between  restrictions  affecting  the importation  of products  and restrictions  affecting imported  products
lost much  of its significance  since  both  types  of restriction  could be made  effective  through  decision  by the monopoly.
The Panel  considered  that  systematic  discriminatory  practices  of the kind  referred  to should  be considered  as restrictions
made  effective  through 'other measures'  contrary to the provision  of Article XI:  1.  "  'Canada-Import,  Distribution'
BISD 35S/89, §4.24.  See also 'Japan-Restriction  on Imports of Certain Agricultural  Products' BISD 35S/229,
§§5.2.2.2.19
to it directly or indirectly under the General Agreement  are being nullified  or impaired or that
the attainment  of any objective  of the General Agreement  is being impeded. These are: (a) the
failure of another contracting  party to carry out its obligations under the Agreement; (b) the
application  by another contracting  party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the
provisions of this Agreement;  or (c) the existence  of any other situation.
The first category (a) constitutes a 'violation' complaint. i.e.,  it can be invoked if a
government policy or measure is deemed to violate a specific GATT Article. Art.XXIII:l(a)
is not applicable  to private anticompetitive  practices, as these  per se do not violate any GAIT
provision.  One Article that must be discussed  in this connection  is Article XXIX (entitled  the
Relation of this Agreement  to the Havana Charter).  Art.XXIX:  1 stipulates that: "contracting
parties undertake  to observe  to the fullest  extent  of their executive  authority  the general principles
of Chapters I to VI inclusive  and of Chapter IX of the Havana Charter pending their acceptance
of it in accordance with their constitutional  procedures."  Chapter V of the Havana Charter"
(HC) is  dedicated to Restrictive Business Practices (RBPs).  It contains a potentially all-
encompassing  list of RBPs that must be addressed by contracting  parties whenever they "have
harmful effects on the expansion  of production or trade and interfere with the achievement  of
any of the other objectives  set forth in Article 1.  "4  The GATT entered into force through the
Protocol of Provisional Application  in the expectation  that the HC would be ratified in the near
future.  This expectation  diu not materialize, and a proposal to delete Art. XXIX  in  1955  was
adopted unanimously. 48 However, failure by one contracting  party to ratify this change to the
General Agreement led to the continued inclusion of the Article in the text of the GATT. 49
Although  Art. XXIX  is technically  still a part of the General Agreement,  contracting  parties are
not bound  by obligations  contained  in Chapter 5 of the HC. This point of view has been  accepted
46  The Havana Charter was supposed to establish the International Trade Organization. It never entered into force
because  the US Congress refused  to ratify it (see Jackson,  1969, pp.36ff).
47  See the Havana Charter,  Article 46, reproduced  in UN Doc. E/Conf.2/78;  Art. I states the objectives of the
Chartei,  which  include trade expansion and income growth.
4" BISD 3S/240.
49 See Protocol Amending Part I and Articles XXIX and XXX of the GAiT,  GATT-Status of Legal Instruments
p.2-7.1 .20
in the GATT case-law.'
Notwithstanding  the 1955  attempt  to eliminate  the link to the  HC, GA1T contracting  parties
established  a Group of Experts in 1958  to study whether and to what extent the GAIT  should
deal with RBPs.' 1 Members of the Group were unable to reach consensus  in their 1960 report.
A majority  considered that it would be unrealistic at that moment  to recommend  the negotiation
of multilateral  disciplines  to control RBPs.  However, they recognized  that RBPs could have a
harmful  effect on international  trade, and proposed  that  bilateral  consultations  take  place  between
interested parties on specific  practices.  The suggested  procedure was to keep this outside the
realm of Article  XXIII (dispute  settlement):  "[members  of the Group]  were  not competent  to  judge
...  whether the provisions of Article XXIII would be applicable. However, the majority were
convinced  that, regardless of the question whether Article XXIII could legally be applied, they
should recommend to the CONTRACTING  PARTIES that they take no action under this
Article."52 A minority proposed a multilateralized  procedure to address RBP-related issues.
A group of experts would  deal with those issues that could not be settled bilaterally, and would
submit a  report  to  the  GAIT  secretariat, which would in  turn  report  annually to  the
CONTRACTING PARTIES.  The disagreement led to a decision to provide a  forum for
consultations  in this area, upon request, and appoint  a group of experts on RBPs "to be convened
when appropriate". 53 While  the adopted  report contains  two differing  opinions  on the possibility
to address RBPs  in the context  of Article XXIII, there was agreement  on one crucial  point: RBPs
could  have  harmful  effects  on world trade. Moreover,  even  the majority  refrained  from  addressing
the crucial question of the general applicability  of Article XXIII in this context.
Virtually  no actions were taken subsequent  to the adoption  of the report of the Group of
SO  wThe  Panel noted  that  the deletion  of Article  XXIX  of the General  Agreement  was proposed  in liS  and accepted
by all but one contracting  party, and that -although  this Article  is technically  still  in force  -it refers to an instrument
which itself has never been implemented  and the acceptance  of which is no longer pending  as is assured in Article
XXIX. This leaves  considerable  doubt  as to the manner  in which its provisions  would  have been  interpreted  if they
had entered into force.' See 'Canada-Administration  of the FIRA^, BISD 30S/161 §5.12.
5' BISD, 7S/29.
52 BISD, 9S/170 ff.
13 Ibid.21
Experts, and virtually  no attempts  have been made  by contracting  parties to address RBPs within
the existing GATT legal framework. The one exception  concerned  EC allegations that certain
measures taken by  the Japanese govemment were inhibiting the  importation of products
manufactured  in the EC.  In its request for the establishment  of a panel, the EC claimed that
benefits of negotiations  with Japan had not been realized because of a number of factors made
it extremely  difficult  for EC products  to penetrate  the  Japanese  market. Factors mentioned  included
the marked  concentration  and interlinking  of the structure  of production, finance  and distribution
in Japan, which made it difficult for foreign suppiiers to establish distribution  channels.'  The
EC argued that such factors nullified  and impaired benefits that would otherwise have accrued
to it.  The discussion that followed in the GATT Council failed to shed light on this case and
ultimately  the EC decided  to refrain from pursuing  it.55  In this case  the EC qualified  its complaint
as a 'situation complaint' under Article XXIII:  1(c)  (Bronckers, 1985,  p.151).  It is questionable
whether Article XXIII:1(c) can provide an appropriate forum to address concerns related to
RBPs.1  GATT drafting history suggests that this option was designed to address exceptional
circumstances/emergency  situations. No panels  have  ever  been established  to examine  a situation
complaint.'
The only forum for competition  policy-related  disputes where  no specific  GATT Articles
are violated  therefore is a non-violation complaint  under Article XXIII:  l(b). The non-violation
provision  has an autonomous  function  in the GATT  dispute-settlement  system. Most  non-violation
'4 See GATr Doc. L/5479.
'5 See  GATT Doc.C/M/167 p.9.
5 The first  sentence  of Article  XXIII:2  reads: 'If no satisfactory  adjustment  is effected  between  the contractin2
parties concemed  within  areasonable  time, orif the difficulty  is of the typedescribed  in paragraph  l(c) of this Article
... ".  Attempts to reach a satisfactory  adjustment  is not a precondition  to seek  the establishment  of a Panel. Taken
into account that the general rules, as embodied  in Article  XXII-XXIII  of GATT, require that for a Panel to be
established  bilateral  consultations  must  have  taken  place, 'situation  complaints'  should  be regarded  only  in exceptional
circumstances  as a possible  means of requesting  establishment  of a Panel. The conditions  under which  complaints
could be qualified as 'situation-complaints' have never been specified  in GAIT case law.
"i  Except  for the aforementioned  case, only once was there a threat of making  use of this provision: following
the accession  of the United Kingdom  to the EC, Canada's access  opportunities  to the UK market  were substantially
reduced. Canada  felt that Article  XXIII:  ic was the appropriate  forum  to address  such issues insofar  as negotiations
under Article  XXIV:6  with  the EC were expected  to be unsuccessful. Subsequently,  however,  Canada dropped  the
case. GAUT  Docs. L/4107, L/M/101, C/W/250, C/W/251. Petersmann  (1991. p. 227) has argued that situation
complaints  are no longer an appropriate  instrument  for adjusting the GATT framework  of rights and obligations.22
cases  brought before GATT  panels have  involved  the nullification  or impairment  of a negotiated
tariff concession  by the introduction  of a subsidy  that could not have been reasonably  anticipated
by the other party at the time the tariff binding was conceded. However, this is by no means
the only type of action that might give rise to non-violation  complaints." 8 As Petersmann  (1991,
p.2 25) points out, "non-violatica  complaints  are based on ... legal principles of effectiveness  of
concessions, reciprocity and bona fide protection of reasonable expectations."  Reasonable
expectations  are created by concessions  negotiated  at any point in time. The Vienna  Convention
on the Law of the Treatis 59 obliges signatory states to refrain from acts frustrating the object
of the treaty they signed (Art.  18) and recognizes,  in more general terms, that all treaties must
be performed in good faith (Art.26).  Taken into account that non-violation  complaints  aim to
protect  the competitive  conditions  established  by agreed  tariff  concessions,  any government  measure
that  offsets  such  concessions  can, in principle,  be brought  before  GATT  as a non-violation  complaint
under Art. XXIII:  1(b).
For anti-competitive  practices to be the subiect-matter  of a non-violation  complaint  three
conditions must be met: (i) the measure must be applied by a government;  (ii) it must alter the
competitive  conditions  established  by the agreed tariff bindings;  and (iii) the measure could not
have been reasonably anticipated at the time the tariff concessions were negotiated. Business
practices that are not subject to any government  involvement  are excluded from the scope  of a
non-violation  complaint.  There is some  ambiguity,  however,  regarding  the  extent  of the government
involvement  that is necessary.  Article XXIII:  1(b)  speaks of 'application of any measure' that
nullifies and impairs benefits.  The term 'measure'  suggests that not only formal laws and
regulations are included but also other forms of government  action that are necessary to mnke
the government  choice operative. In this respect, the interpretation  of the terms 'requirements'
and 'measures' in GAIT case-law  provides useful guidance. The term 'application', suggests
I In the GATr legal system, Article  XXVIII  (modification  of scehedules)  for example, can also provide  a forum
for such complaints.
39Reprinted  in Interwional Legal  Materials,  8, 679, 1969. The Convention  applies  only  to subsequently  concluded
treaties. The  portion  governing  general  interpretation  of trmaties  is considered  to  be codifying  customary  international
law and therefore applies to treaties concluded  before its entry into force and is binding  even on countries that are
not parties  to it.23
that positive action is required.  If correct, then the mere tolerance by a government of a RBP
is not sufficient grounds for a non-violation  complaint. However, if tolerance  is reflected  in a
positive (specific)  action, the first criterion will be satisfied. An example  coulJ be an exemption
by the  competent  anti-trust  authorities  granted  to private  enterprises  that  effectively  redt'ces market
access  opportunities  for products  of third  countries  by establishing  difficult  to  penetrate  distribution
channels.  In such cases, if the action (exemption)  could not have been reasonably anticipated
at the time market  access  conditions  were negotiated,  a contracting  party might  bring  a non-violation
complaint.
The 'application of a measure' is, of course, the means through which nullification  and
impairment  of ',enefits  might  occur. Non-violation  complaints  were designed  to address  the concern
of contracting  parties relatii1g  to modification' of the agreed competitive  conditions (based on
the negotiated tariff , ';rcesslons) through subsequent  government  action.  Such action is likely
to take  the form of positive  behaviour,  and Article XXIII:  1  (b)  reflects this. If, however,  the accent
is placed on the means that lead to the prohibited result rather than on the prohibited  result as
such, one might end with the inconsisterm  conclusion  that only some forms of government  action
leading to nullification  can be addressed  and others not.  A teleological  approach  is appropriate
here. As the key criterion is nullification  and impairment,  the means  that might lead to this  result
should  be interpreted in a flexible  way. 6"  In this sense, not only positive actIon  but also passive
tolerance  of a RBP, to the extent that it nullifies  or impairs established  competitive  conditions,
could give  rise to a non-violation  complaint,  and this independently  of the legal action that might
be taken on the domestic plane.
Even if one accepts that passive tolerance  is sufficient, the second ne'essary condition
illustrates  a clear limitation  of the GATT  as regards bringing  competition  policy-related  disputes.
RBPs  producing  extraterritorial  effects  cannot  be brought  before a GATT  panel. This is because
in practice non-violation  complaints  aim at preserving the competitive  conditions  established  on
the basis of negotiated  tariff concessions,  which  concern  only import tariffs. Export  concessions
'0  In the negative sense,  of course, since nothing  prevents contracting  parties from improving  unilaterally  the
agreed market access opportunities.
61 After all, flexibility  is not only one of the key concepts  of the interpretation  of GATr-law, but probably one
of the main reasons of its success.24
are not negotiatod  in GATT. Consequently,  only practices that deny market access  opportunities
in the domestic  market can be the object of such complaints.
Tuming to the third condition,  'unexpectedness',  Panels  have interpreted  the scope  of the
protection  of 'reasonable  expectations'  under  GATT  as follows. First, the balance  of concessions
is the highest ranking norm that has to be protected  in the GAIT  system against both legal and
illegal actions disturbing this balance.  Second, contracting  parties can reasonably  expect that
this balance will not be nullified or impaired, failing evidence to the contrary." 2 The content
of the term 'reasonabie expectations' has not been interpreted in GATT case-law. Panels tend
to follow a case-by-case  approach. Indeed, one can question whether it is appropriate at all to
define specific criteria determining the reasonableness  of expectations. The answer could be
provided  through  a procedural  rule: if 'failing  evidence  to the contrary' is always  to be interpreted
as a shift of the burden of proof on the contrasting party trying to reject the argument that
something  was reasonably  expected,  then 'reasonable  expectations'  will be perceived  to be always
present  and therefore  protected  when  a concession  is negotiated,  unless  the contracting  party that
allegedly modified the value of the concession  provides evidence to the contrary.  If the term
'evidence' is given its ordinary meaning,  then the imposed standard of proof on the contracting
party invoking the unreasonableness  of expectations  is high. 63 The substantive  content of the
term 'reasonable  ex=ectations'  can therefore  be argued  to be of secondary  importance,  since  these
exist until proven unreasonable.  If this interpretation is accepted, the onus will be on the
contracting  party that alters the value of the concession  to show that  at the time it was negotiated
serious reasons should have led the other contracting  party to believe that the agreed level of
62 '[T]he recognition  of the legitimacy  of an expectation  relating to the use of production  subsidies  in no way
prevents a contracting  party from using production  subsidies  consistently  with the General Agreement; it merely
delineates  the scope of the protection  of a negotiated  balance  of concessions.  See Report of the Panel on 'EEC-
Payments  and Subsidies  Paid to Processors  and Producers  of Oilseeds  and Related  Animal  Feed Proteins', adopted
on 25 January 1990, Lt6627, BISD 37S/128, §148. Also, 'A contracting  party which  has negotiated  a concession
under  Article II may  be assumed,  for the purpose  of Article XXIII,  to  have  a reasonable  expectation,  failing  evidence
to  the contrary, that  the value  of the concession  will  not be nullified  or impaired  by the  contracting  party  which  granted
the concession  by the subsequent  introduction  or increase  of a domestic  subsidy  on the product  concerned.' Report
of the Working Party on 'Other Barriers to Trade',  BISD  3S/224, §15.
60  The French translation of the term 'evidence' in the GATr Anti-Dumping  Code for example  is 'elements
de preuve'.25
competitive  conditions would eventually  be reduced (modified negatively  in the future). 6'
IV.  Maintaining Competitive Coaditions: The Limits of GATT
The examination  of the case law in the context of Articles II,  XVII and XI demonstrates
that complaints  may  be brought  against  busine3s  practices  if they  are supported  by the government
and ifthis disturbs the competitive  conditions  established  by the GATr regime.  In principle, such
support may consist of passive tolerance  (defacto  exclusion from competition  laws or the non-
enforcement  of such  laws)  or more  active  involvement  (i.e., antitrust  exemptions).  Active  support
may  also take the form of subsidies, taxes  or trade barriers.  Two paths are available  in principle
to dispute  government support of anticompetitive  business practices. The first is to charge that
a contracting party has violated a GATT obligation.  The second is to bring a non-violation
complaint, arguing that a measure that is not GATT-inconsistent  has nonetheless  led to the
nullification  or impairment  of a existing  tariff  concession,  or impedes  the realization  of an objective
of the General Agreement. Under current GATT  rules and principles, anticompetitive  business
practices  that  are passively  supported  by governments  can only  be addressed  through  a non-violation
complaint. Active support will usually lead to a violation  complaint (see eximple below).  In
the first case the initial legal relationship  between  thie  government  and the enterprise(s)  suffices
in terms of bringing a case to GATT.  In the second case it does not; the government  must also
impose measures that: (1) support the business practice; and (2) violate a GAIT  obligation.
If, for example, an antitrust  exemption  underlies  the existence  of a cartel, the exemption
6" One may nonetheless  speculate  as to what could come under the term 'reasonable expectations'. Can, e.g.,
a contracting  party reasonably  expect  another  GATr contracting  party  to respect  its  declarations  in  other  international
fora? If so, then 'The Set of Multilaterally  Agreed Equitable Principles  and Rules for the Control  of Restrictive
Business  Practices' concluded  at the UN (reproduced  in Internaiional  Legal Materials,  19, 1980,  p. 813) might  be
the basis  of reasonable  expectations  between  GATr contracting  parties that  they  will not alter the value  of negotiated
concessions  (after  22 April 1980,  the date of adoption  of the Set)  through  behaviour  inconsistent  with  the set ofagreed
principles. Notwithstanding  the non-binding  character  of the UN resolutions,  the argument  can be made  that such
acts  oblige  signatories  at least to act  in a non-inconsistent  way. For a discussion  of this 'anti-inconsistency'  principle,
see Baade (1980). Roessler (1978, p. 40) calls such non-binding  rules defacto agreements  and defines  them as
"declarations  intended  to give ground to expect  performance  or forbearance  of ac tions without  creating legal rights
and obligations.'  This has been supported  by Berrisch  (1991). The logical counter-argument  is, of course, that
limits must be placed on the application  of this reasoning,  as otherwise  everything  under the sun might  be brought
before GATT. However, the issue here is not whether a convention  signed  outside GATT legitimises  a cause of
action in GATT, but simply  what can be understood  to uunstitute  a reasonable  expectation. The cause of action  in
the GATT context is the nullification  or impairment  of the agreed balance of concessie  ns.26
in itself will not be sufficient for a violation case.  What is necessary is that the government
supports the operation of the cartel through  other policies.  Articles III, XVII, or XI may then
come into play.  Take the case of a cartel tL.at  is legally formed under a country's antitrust law.
This constitutes  active  support  by the government. If the cartel consists  of all or most of the firms
in the industry, it can be argued to be subject to Art.XVII in the sense that the exemption  is a
privllege granted by the government. 65 The cartel will then be subject  to the nondiscrimination
principle and is required to make sales or purchases on the basis of commercial  considerations.
If it can be shown that it does discriminate or does not follow commercial  considerations,  the
action  may  be found  to violate  the GATT. Moreover, if the government  protects  the cartel through
tax exemptions,  trade barriers or other  policies  that imply  discrimination  against  foreign  products,
these practices may be attacked through Art.III."  Similarly, if it has a distribution monopoly
it must respect Art.III.  To the extent that such government 'support services' are necessary  to
the survival of the cartel, the anti-competitive  practice may be eliminated.' 7 If QRs are used
to support  the cartel, Art. XI may  be violated. Finally, recourse  miglht  be made  to a non-violation
complaint  based upon the non-enforcement  or non-existence  of competition  legislation,  or (in the
context  of the present example)  that an antitrust exemption  is a govemment  measure in the sense
of Article XXIII:l(b).
Non-violation  constitutes  the primary avenue  to address competition  policy-related  issues
through GATT.  The only possibility that exists in principle for bringing such cases to GATT
as violation complaints  is to argue that competition  policy enforcement  or nonenforcement  is a
defacto  subsidy to a domestic industry.  Trachtman (1993) has argued exactly this, making a
case that exemptions  or non-enforcement  constitutes  what he calls a 'regulatory subsidy' and as
such could be the subject  of nullification  and impairment  claims, and may be countervailed  once
6  Art.XVII  speaks  of state trading  enterprises  or enterprises  granted  special  privileges. As a result it is unclear
whether its disciplines  apply to a cartel, and this is something  to be determined  by a Panel. In many circumstances
a government  sanctioned  cartel will  exert substantial  market  power,  if not  imply  effective  monopolization  ofa market.
If the industry has an import/export  monopoly  Art.XVII applies of course.
'f As noted earlier, GATT case law has made clear that it is not necessary  for there to be actual imports.
67 Again, the anticompetitive  practice itself is not addressed. But this is irrelevant to the issue at hand, as in
many instances such practites are supported by government  actions that may violate GAIT obligations.27
they are identified.  Abstracting from the issue of whether such government actions can be
considered as subsidies for purposes of the GATT and the GATT Subsidies  Code - a question
that is unlikely  to be answered in the affirmative  by a panel - this does not appear to be a good
strategy from a systemic  perspective. It opens a Pandora's box, as any government  action that
can be argued  t. have  a specific  impact  on an industry  becomes  potentially  countervailable.  Pursuit
of the non-violation  strategy appears to be more preferable, as well as more feasible.
Although  the scope to use GATT to address competition  policy-related  concerns is wider
than is commonly thought, the foregoing analysis reveals that the reach of GATT is limited.
Abstracting  from 'traditional' trade restrictions  (tariffs, antidumping,  other NTMs), six 'lacunae,
can be singled  out. The first three of these are competition  policy-specific,  the remainder  are more
general. The issue for policymakers  to determine  is how  important  the 'holes' are.  First, purely
private business practices restricting  access to markets  that are not supported  by the government
cannot  be attacked as a violation of GATT.  Nor can they be contested  through a non-violation
complaint. While at first sight this would appear to be a major 'hole', in many circumstances
an anticompetitive  business practice will be supported by the government in some way.  This
may  take  the form of passive support  or tolerance  (e.g., non-enforcement  of antitrust  law -and/or
more active forms of support (e.g., antitrust  exemptions,  or subsidies). As long as such support
can be identified, recourse to GATT may be made.  Of course, importing firms may have
monoposony  power vis-a-vis  exporters, in which  case  exercise  of such  power  is likely to enhance
national welfare. The issue here is in large part empirical:  how important are anticompetitive
business  practices that are not supported by governments? What is the national distribution  of
private monopsony  power? We are not aware of research that has addressed this question. Our
intuition  is that in many, if not most, cases governments  will be involved, often by restricting
access to markets.
Second, competition  policy  per se is also not addressed by GATT, which  is of course the
reason why the non-violation  route is the only one available  to contracting  parties.  Clearly there
are differences in national antitrust laws that affect the international  'playing field'.  But there
are of course a myriad of policies that do this.  Again, advocates  of pursuing multilateral  rules
on competition policies must make a  convincing argument why multilateral disciplines on28
competition  policies should be given priority over other policies that reduce the contestability
of markets. The major example  in this connection  is antidumping  (see Section II). If a credible
argument  could be made that the abolition  of antidumping  would follow  the adoption  of common
competition  policies, this would greatly strengthen the case of those calling for international
competition  rules. But, as discussed  in Section  II, the precondition  for this to be possible  appears
to be that countries  are ready to contemplate  significantly  deeper  integration  (including  free trade)
ian they have been willing to pursue in the recent past. The likelihood  of this occurring in the
multilateral  context should realistically  be considered to be low, as illustrated by the inability
(or unwillingness)  of the U.S. and the EC to abolish  antidumping  in recent free trade agreements
with third countries (NAFTA and the Europe Agreements,  respectively). 68 It will arguably be
more  productive  to continue  to seek further liberalization  of market  access conditions,  including
policies on FDI, and continue to publicize the economic irrationality of  antidumping.  As
emphasized  by Finger (1993, Chapter 4), the only politically  effective  resistance to antidumping
comes  from domestic  industries  that  are negatively  affected  by the  resulting  impacts  on input  prices
and uncertainty.  Multilateral attempts to tighten the rules can only have a limited effect on
disciplining  the use of these  measures. Ultimately,  dealing  with  antidumping  is a domestic  political
issue.
Third, the reach of GATr is currently  restricted  to action  or inaction  by governments  that
affect the conditions of competition  in their markets. Practices by firms on export markets or
lack of regulation  on the part of a government  regarding  behavior  of firms under its jurisdiction
on export markets  cannot  be addressed. Thus the oft encountered  statement  that GATT  does not
discipline  export cartels.  While true, it should be recognized  that the same applies to actions
by governments themselves that have detrimental effects on competition in export markets.
Although  export prohibitions  or quantitative  restrictions  are forbidden  under Art.  XI, and export
subsidies  on manufactures  are prohibited  for industrialized  countries,  current  GATT  rules basically
give  contracting  parties  the freedom  to impose  tariffs on exports. They  also allow  for the formation
Z This is not to say that the tmde-off  cannot be made. The recent European  Economic  A-ea Agreement  and
the 1988  revision  of the Australia-New  Zealand  Closer  Economic  Relations  Trade  Agreement  illustrate  that  sovereign
states may  agree to abolish  antidumping  and adopt  common  antitrust  disciplines. However,  the degree  of economic
integration  pursued  by the countries  involved  is far-reaching  and is unlikely  to  be feasible  in the multilateral  context.29
of export monopolies,  the disciplines  of Art.XVII in this regard being limited. This implies that
contracting  parties remain substantially  free to attempt  to shift the terms of trade in their favour.
Efforts to agree to multilateral  disciplines  on export cartels, even if successful, will have to be
complemented  by analogous  tightening  of the rules regarding the scope that exists for countries
to pursue 'strategic' trade policy. The significance  of the 'hole' in GATT with respc-:t  to export
cartels and similar business  practices is, of course, also an empirical issue.  Our reading of the
literature suggests that concerns about anti-competitive  practices in import markets that are
supported or tolerated by importing country govemments  tend to dominate. 69
Fourth, the GATT pertains to products, not to producers. This is, of course, a reflection
of the fact that it applies to merchandise  trade, not to factors of production such as capital or
labor, or to producers of intangibles  (services,  know-how,  intellectual  property). Many of these
issues are on the agenda of the Uruguay Round.  Foreign direct investment (FDI) has become
increasingly  important  in the last decade, both in quantitative  and in qualitative  terms.  The draft
General Agreement  on Trade in Services (GATS)  explicitly  covers FDI as a 'mode of supply'.
As far as FDI in the goods sector is concemed, there will only be the Trade-related  Investment
Measures  CIRIMs)  agreement,  which  only pertains  to policies  such  as local content. If the Round
is concluded  successfully,  some 'GAIT'  disciplines  on FDI will exist. However, such  disciplines
will be much more far-reaching  for services than for goods.  This inconsistency  would appear
to be one important  issue for a future round.
Fifth, GATT  has little  to say about  non-discriminatory  regulations  that  restrict  market  access,
e.g. limitations  on the number  of firms  allowed  to contest  a market,  with monopoly  as an extreme.
National treatment is clearly not sufficient to ensure that markets are contestable. This was
recognized  explicitly  by the services  negotiators  and was reflected  in the so-called  market  access
commitments  in the draft GATS. 70 From a market access or contestability  perspective, the
weaknesses  of existing GAIT disciplines  stems  in large  part from the fact that  national  treatment
is the fundamental  obligation. Expanding  the negotiating  agenda  to go beyond  national  treatment
69  The Strategic  Impediments  Initiative  (SII)  talks  between  Japan and the U.S. are an illustration,  as are similar
albeit less 'formal' talks between  Japan and the EC.
1°  See Hoekman (1992) for a discussion  of the GATS.30
clearly has major implications for the General Agreement. But, if the objective  is to enhance
competition,  going  beyond  existing  disciplines  in this  regard are likely  to be necessary. The GATS
experience illustrates  that this is feasible  without  abandoning  the traditional  GATr approach to
international  cooperation.
Sixth,  GATT  dispute  settlement  procedures  are often  criticized  as being  relatively  ineffectual.
Although  rules and procedures have been improved  since the launching  of the Uruguay  Round,
and will be further strengthened  if the round is concluded,  the fact remains that trade sanctions
are the ultimate 'stick' available  to a contracting  party.  Such retaliation  is not beneficial  for the
imposing  country  in that the costs to itself may  easily outweigh  the costs to the offending  country
that does not  comply  with adopted  panel reports. And for small  countries  it is not a credible  threat
at all. Further improvement  in the procedures  to enforce  GATT obligations  is an important  task
facing  negotiators. However, it is a task that must be undertaken  independent  of the competition
policy  issue. It would  be disingenuous  to argue  that  because  of GATT  inadequaci,s  in this domain
(which are typically  overstated) a new institutional  approach is necessary for the enforcement
of multilaterally  agreed competition  policy disciplines. After all, the same problems that arise
in the GATT context can be expected to arise.
V. Concluding Remarks
The desirability  of introducing  competition  policy  on the agenda of a future multilateral
trade negotiation depends importantly on  how much weight is  attached to  increasing the
contestability  of markets. If the latter is the objective,  efforts must continue  to focus on moving
the GATT system furtler towards achieving 'free market access' i.e.,  free trade in goods and
services complemented  by freedom of investment.  Restrictions on market access are anti-
competitive. The further countries move towards free market access, the less scope there will
be for restrictive business practices to be pursued by firms on intemational markets.
Experience  suggests  that  agreement  on the  adoption  of common  antitrust  rules  or enforcement
procedures is not easily attained in a multilateral  setting. It has only been  achieved  in a regional
context, and then only in conjunction  with the adoption  of relatively far-reaching  disciplines  on
other government  policies  (including  subsidies),  the abolition  of barriers to trade, and substantial  -31
if not total  -libaeralization  of direct  investment  and  other capital  flows. In the absence  of agreement
that the objective  in the GATr context should  be to pursue economic  integration  of the EC-type,
in the multilateral  setting  progress will be limited to further 'negative  integration'.  The easiest
way of introducing  competition  policy-related  concerns  is then to attempt  to reach agreement  that
certain policies should not be pursued and to extend the reach of GAIT's  dispute settlement
mechanism  to such issues.  But it would arguably be better from a competition  perspective to
continue to focus negotiating  effort on further liberalization  of markets.
The extent to  which the inclusion of competition policy-related disciplines requires
substantive changes to  current rules  may be  rather  limited.  In  many instances private
anticompetitive  practices will be supported  by governments,  passively  through  non-enforcement
or non-existence  of competition  policies, as well as more actively through  other measures  such
as antitrust exemptions, subsidies, or trade barriers.  As discussed above, some of these active
types  of support  are already  GAIT inconsistent  and  can therefore  be contested  as being  in violation
with GATT obligations. Other policies,  including  competition  policy in general,  are in principle
GATT legal. But, if the measures  that are implemented  by the government  disturbs pre-existing
competitive  conditions that were negotiated  in the GATT and were not foreseen at the time, a
non-violation  complaint may be brought.
Non-violation  complaints  are the primary  avenue for bringing cases  to GATT  that  directly
attack the implementation  of a country's antitrust  legislation,  or nonexistence  thereof. Although
potentially  the non-violation  option contained  in Article XXIII of the GATT is a powerful tool,
it has not yet been put to the test.  Invocation  of this option by contracting  parties would help
determine  the limits of the GATT in this regard, and help identify  the policies that are deemed
most 'problematical'. A more  intensive  use of the existing  GATT mechanisms,  however  imperfect,
would help offset the current lack of data regarding  the policies that have given rise to calls for
introducing  competition  policy  on a multilateral  negotiating  agenda. Indeed, the virtual absence
of such cases could support the hypothesis  that the issue is not really a first-order concern of
governments.32
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